This page from my War-time notebook is dated 1944. These machine-guns, rifles and small arms supported by mortar bombardment were the basic elements of the infantry battle, in attack or defence. We expected the enemy's fire-fight to be supplemented by field artillery and heavier medium field guns firing before and during an attack; in close combat meet hand-thrown and rifle-fired grenades and flame throwers as part of the lethal mix.

Tanks were always a frightening hazard to both German and British infantry. When they appeared we had protect ourselves with anti-tank hand-held weapons. With prior knowledge or expectation of their deployment we sited anti-tank guns to deal with the threat. In defence we laid anti-tank mines and dug delaying ditches, with anti-personnel mines to delay the attacker in a designated area covered by pre-registered artillery, mortar, machine-gun and rifle fire. However, when attacking an enemy position we had to be prepared to quickly overcome delaying obstacles by artillery fire and bold use of bangalore torpedoes to create gaps in the German wire to move our attack forward on to the German 'strong-points' as rapidly as possible.


German Mortars: (l to r)
Range5cm 568 yards; Short 8cm 1,200 yards; Normal 8cm 2,600 yards.

 


British 3-in Mortar: range 1600 yards.

 
 
We had great respect for the very effective German mortar organisation. As a counter-balance, the British 25-pound artillery was superb as a close support weapon and clearly superior to the German Light Infantry Gun-Howitzers.

  18/25 pdr gun and limber
German 7.5cm Infantry Gun-Howitzer.  
British 25-Pounder Field Gun.

German Defensive Positions

The Intelligence file noted German defence tactics based on intelligence from the North African and the Italian campaigns, where they prepared formidable defensive lines. A map captured at Anzio shows an example of a two-battalion regiment in a strongly held defensive position; it is shown below.

The situation in Europe following the successful establishment of the bridgehead at Normandy and the subsequent break-through after the capture of Caen, it forced the Germans to use an aggressive 'mobile' defence role. Their overall strategy was to delay our advance and provide the German High Comand time to develop operational manoeuvreability to regain the initiative. A strong feature of their defence was the immediate counter-attack and to try and recover lost ground, especially their key 'strong-points' when these were over-run.

Although trained and prepared to attack orthodox in-depth defence positions we now expected to attack this form of 'mobile' defence which the Germans became quickly became quickly adept and skilled at using. It was based on establishing a series of strong points, 'nests of all arms', deployed to defend features such as hills and ridges, villages and road junctions, woods and river lines. We equally became skilled in pushing through the objective after a successful attack to seize the ground available to repel the expected counter-attack, possibly by a 'battle-group' of infantry or tanks and infantry. We knew key positions previously occupied by the Germans would be pre-registered by their artillery and a heavy bombardment expected. It was axomatic for us to immediately dig in to protect and co-ordinate our fields of fire with neighbouring units.

This sketch shows the static defence layout by a Two-Battalion Grenadier Regiment at Anzio.

   

Attacking this position we would expect to meet two screens of troops deployed forward of the main defensive line. Aa screen of lightly manned advanced positions about 5000 yards in front, then about 3000 yards behind troops dug-in but ready to fall back to the main forward 'battle outposts' if likely to be over-run. These were to delay us and to make prematurely deploy and hold us pinned down in their field of fire ranged for divisional artillery, infantry field guns and mortars as well as MGs.

Reaching the forward main defensive belt, the urgent need was to secure several break-through points through the concertina wire and minefields. The minefields at Anzio measured 150 yards by 25 yards with anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. Our artillery would have targetted these wire/minefield hazards and our forward troops ready to use bangalore torpeodes to open up the wire. Once through, attack would be concentrated on the 'nests of all arms' with their MMG42s and riflemen in weapon pits with dugouts built in their rear. Our artillery barrage timed to assist us launch our assault: advancing in phases of fire and movement, each section and platoon supporting each other as they attacked their allotted objectives. In the close encounter each side ready to use bayonets, grenades and anti-personnel missiles.

The second line of defence 900 to 1700 yards behind the main forward line tackled by reserve troops passing through us to take on the next series of strong-points. These may not necessarily closely supporting by cross-fire leaving open ground between them to be protected by wire and mines and/or anti-tank ditches, all intended to force us into the fire of their Mg42s and riflemen. This could be the time both sides use flame throwers and anti-personnel missles.

Germans are adept at camouflage and preparing alternative positions, sometimes dummy positions. Snipers with telescopic-sighted rifles are skilfully used and extensively deployed. The German believe the defence battle has been has won when they have worn us out and then successfully routed by a flank attack.


 


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